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“Incident to Service”: Narrowing the Scope of the Feres Doctrine in Military Medical Malpractice
Thomas A. Campbell*
Abstract: In 1950 the Supreme Court ruled that the government is not liable for injuries sustained
by United States military personnel arising out of or in the course of activity “incident to service.” 1
The practical effect of this ruling, referred to as the Feres Doctrine, is that servicemembers are
barred from collecting punitive damages from the United States government for any personal
injuries sustained while on active duty. This bar on legal remedies has been applied to cases of
medical malpractice, sexual assault, rape, physical violence, driving under the influence of alcohol
or narcotics, exposure to deathly substances, and discrimination. 2 While each of these categories
warrant further discussion, the focus of this Essay will be limited to medical malpractice. On
December 19, 2020, President Trump signed the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act which
contained a provision curtailing the Feres Doctrine’s reach as it relates to medical malpractice. 3
As a result, servicemembers can now file administrative claims with the Department of Defense
for compensation for medical malpractice. 4 Despite rhetoric suggesting a complete success, this
law has a fairly narrow application, has yet to be properly enacted, and is far from an overturn of
Feres.
I.

Introduction:

Before 1946, sovereign immunity, a descendent of the common law principle of “the King
can do no wrong,” provided an almost complete bar to civil tort actions against the United States
government.5 It was not until the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on June 25,
1946 that Congress allowed United States citizens to recover for torts committed by federal
employees or members of the armed forces.6 There were, of course, several exceptions laid out
by the FTCA in which the government retained limited liability.
The primary, and vastly expansive, exception to the FTCA is the “discretionary function
exception” (DFE), which provides that the United States is not liable for any claim “based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.”7 The DFE has two prongs: (1) due care and (2) discretionary function. 8 The
first inquiry in this analysis is whether the actions taken by the employee were discretionary or
controlled by required statutes or regulations.9 If the employee was subject to a particular statute
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or regulation, the federal court will apply the due care prong.10 The due care inquiry is
straightforward and follows a standard negligence analysis. Either the statute or regulation would
lay out an applicable standard of care, or, if not, the standard would be an objective inquiry of
whether the employee used due care in applying the statute or regulation. 11 The FTCA does not
define the second prong, the discretionary prong, and is therefore far more unclear. This lack of
clarity has been the root of many discussions and debates over the applicability of the FTCA. 12
The DFE is the first of thirteen exceptions to the FTCA described in 28 U.S.C § 2680. The
most relevant of these remaining twelve exceptions provides that sovereign immunity will not be
waived in “any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces or the
Coast Guard in time of war.”13 On its face, this exception appears to apply exclusively to injuries
sustained by servicemembers involved in combat operations during wartime. When considered
alongside the DFE, however, this provision has raised, and continues to raise, several questions as
to how the FTCA should be applied to injuries sustained by servicemembers and their families
from factors “incident to service,” but unrelated to combat operations. This vaguely defined
phrase, which the Supreme Court used in the 1950 case Feres v. United States, has become the
focal point of the controversy surrounding the Feres Doctrine.14 Without an adequate definition,
this phrase has become an almost complete liability shield in virtually any case involving
servicemembers. If Congress provides a clear and concise definition of actions and injuries
“incident to service,” the impunity perpetrators currently enjoy will cease, and military leadership
will be given the tools needed to address many of the harms servicemembers currently face.
II.

Feres v. United States (1950)

The Feres Doctrine is derived from three separate Supreme Court cases reviewed in 1950.
The first, Feres v. United States, involved an active duty soldier stationed at Pine Camp, New York
(today Fort Drum, New York), who was killed in a barracks fire. 15 The executrix of his estate
brought suit against the federal government under the FTCA, alleging the fire was the result of the
Government’s negligent failure to detect and correct the defect in the barracks’ heating system as
well as failure to maintain a fire watch. 16 In Jefferson v. United States, a soldier underwent
abdominal surgery. 17 During a subsequent operation, a 30 inch by 18 inch towel imprinted with
“Medical Department, U.S. Army” was found in his abdomen.18 The last case, Griggs v. United
States, involved a suit against the federal government by the executrix of an active duty soldier
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who died in the midst of surgery.19 The Supreme Court granted review of all three cases and
consolidated them for appeal. 20
In a near unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court concluded that the Government is not liable
under the FTCA for injuries to servicemembers arising out of or in the course of activity “incident
to service.”21 The Court’s ruling, and failure to define the phrase “incident to service,” essentially
rewrote the FTCA as it pertains to servicemembers. An exception to the FTCA maintains
sovereign immunity to “any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces or the Coast Guard, during time of war.”22 The Court, however, considered this exception
in tandem with 28 U.S.C. § 2671 which defines “employee of the Government” to include
“members of the military or naval forces of the United States,” and provides that “acting within
the scope of his office or employment, in the case of a member of the military or naval forces of
the United States, means acting in the line of duty.” 23 The Court applied this interpretation to the
DFE, finding the FTCA “infer[s] allowance of claims arising from noncombat activities in
peace.”24 This inference has been described by one commentator as “one of the most extreme
examples of judicial activism in the history of the Supreme Court.” 25
The Court’s reasoning in Feres is widely contested. Had Congress intended the FTCA to
bar the entire Department of Defense from civil tort litigation in any circumstance, they would
have done so explicitly. 26 What the FTCA does say explicitly is that sovereign immunity is not
waived in claims arising out of “combatant” activities “in times of war.”27 Had Congress intended
28 U.S.C. section 2671’s definitions to be the Court’s guiding principles, then creation of such an
exception would be unnecessary. Similarly, the FTCA would not have used the qualifying term
“combatant” or phrase “in a time of war” if they did not intend those qualifiers to be
determinative.28 The Court’s language suggests they are filling in the gaps of the FTCA, but this
was less a “gap-filler” and more a completely new prohibition on liability not created by Congress.
Feres continues to receive bipartisan criticism in both chambers of Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the Executive. Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent in United States v. Johnson (1997),
and joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, wrote:
In sum, neither the three original Feres reasons nor the post hoc rationalization of
‘military discipline’ justifies our failure to apply the FTCA as written. Feres was
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wrongly decided and heartily deserves the ‘widespread, almost universal criticism’
it has received.29
In 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for another case, Daniel v. United States,
refusing to reconsider Feres.30 The case arose from a claim of medical malpractice and wrongful
death by Lieutenant Commander Walter Daniel behalf of his late wife, Lieutenant Rebekah Daniel,
who died from postpartum hemorrhaging four hours after what was considered a low-risk
pregnancy.31 The Ninth Circuit “regretfully reach[ed] the conclusion that his claim [was] barred
by the Feres Doctrine.”32 Justice Thomas, dissenting from the Supreme Court’s denial of
certiorari, argued that “denial of relief to military personnel and distortions of other areas of law
to compensate — will continue to ripple through our jurisprudence as long as the Court refuses to
reconsider Feres.”33 Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Thomas in a willingness to grant certiorari. 34
As Justice Jackson noted in his opinion, if Congress believes the Supreme Court wrongly
decided Feres, then Congress has the power to amend the FTCA. 35 Despite numerous attempts
over the past seventy years, however, no bills have been enacted by Congress to overturn Feres.36
While Congress has amended the FTCA, until 2020, none of these amendments impacted the
Court’s interpretation of Feres.37
III.

Justifications for the Feres Doctrine

In considering the expansive impact of the “incident to service” bar used in Feres, it is
worth considering the justifications behind the Supreme Court’s ruling and the opposition
presented to any attempts to overrule it. Some of the more compelling justifications relate to the
importance of maintaining military chain-of-command discipline and the existence of adequate
alternative remedies.
First, military discipline and the adherence to a chain-of-command is the backbone of
military organizational culture and effectiveness. The concern is that if servicemembers are able
to sue, the chain-of-command structure would “get bogged down in lengthy and possibly frivolous
lawsuits [that may] substantially disrupt the military mission . . . [taking] resources away from
compelling military needs to avoid legal actions.” 38 To restate, supporters of the Feres Doctrine
want to insulate military leadership from the fear of civil tort litigation. If the liability shield is
lifted, military leaders will have to second-guess each of their decisions for fear of legal
ramifications, thereby undermining the military’s effectiveness, efficiency, and allocation of
resources.
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However, there are no concrete data, studies, or documented history to support the assertion
that access to Article III courts to address egregious misconduct undermines the UCMJ. 39 Lifting
the liability shield “means only that there would be a remedy in a court of law for isolated,
undeniably unacceptable misconduct clearly not essential to military operations, order, or
discipline.”40 The argument that allowing a servicemember’s claim undermines military discipline
only makes sense if that claim was in relation to a sanction action, such as compliance with a
commander’s guidance. Medical malpractice does not satisfy this requirement. Furthermore,
preventing servicemember claims relating to egregious misconduct is more likely to foster a toxic
command climate and undermine military discipline. If egregious misconduct is allowed to
continue without proper accountability, there is little incentive for perpetrators to cease or take
necessary precautions.
Second, proponents of the Feres Doctrine argue that the system in place for military
compensation is adequate to address such claims.41 The current compensation framework provides
funds to servicemembers with injuries “incident to service” in the way of free medical care and
receiving generous insurance, retirement, and other general benefits without having to prove
fault.42 Additional recovery in Article III courts for those already receiving such benefits may be
seen as unjust enrichment. 43 These arguments fail to consider the possibility that these benefits
may be insufficient or too unreliable to appropriately or adequately remedy injured
servicemembers. Furthermore, the unjust enrichment argument assumes that courts would allow
a servicemember to seek and receive damages twice for the same costs. 44 A simple solution to this
issue would be giving servicemembers the opportunity to opt-out of the military compensation
system to pursue a civil tort claim. 45
IV.

The 2020 National Defense Authorization Act

The fact that a provision allowing medical malpractice claims for servicemembers was
included in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act is due in large part to the activism of
Sergeant First Class (SFC) Richard Stayskal. 46 In early 2017 SFC Stayskal was misdiagnosed
with pneumonia by military medical personnel after observing what “even an inexperienced ‘[first
year] resident would have seen’” as cancer. 47 By the time SFC Stayskal was properly diagnosed
by civilian doctors, the cancer had spread through the rest of his body and he was given a life
expectancy of one year. 48
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In 2019, the “SFC Richard Stayskal Military Medical Accountability Act of 2019” was
proposed in both chambers of Congress with bipartisan support.49 The bill was meant to “amend
chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, to allow suit against the United States for injuries and
deaths of the Armed Forces of the United States caused by improper medical care, and for other
purposes.”50 Despite bipartisan support in the House of Representatives and Senate, the bill faced
procedural challenges. Senator Lindsey Graham, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
opposed the bill as written, citing concerns about “opening Pandora’s box” and exposing the
Pentagon to constant court battles. 51 Rather than allowing servicemembers to sue, the resulting
compromise allows “claim[s] against the United States for personal injury or death incident to the
service of a member of the uniformed services that was caused by the medical malpractice of a
Department of Defense health care provider” provided that the “act or omission constituting
medical malpractice occurred in a covered military medical treatment facility.” 52
While a step in the right direction, the 2020 NDAA leaves several questions unanswered.
For example, the provision inadequately addresses claims by third parties. This is especially
problematic in cases involving military mothers. A recent, notable case that highlights this issue
is Ortiz v. United States. In Ortiz, the Tenth Circuit barred the husband of a female Air Force
officer from bringing a claim against the government for the brain trauma suffered by their child
due to a negligent delivery. 53 The Ortiz case highlights how the Feres Doctrine has not only
limited the government’s liability to servicemembers, but also to claims brought by a third party
when a third party’s injury is derived from an injury sustained to a servicemember, referred to as
the “genesis test.”54 The genesis test, as used in Ortiz, requires the court to determine first whether
there was an “incident-to-service injury to a servicemember and second whether the injury to the
third party was derivative of that injury.” 55 In Ortiz, the court ruled that the child’s oxygen loss
was the result of the servicemember’s drop in blood pressure allegedly caused by negligent
administration of medication, and therefore Feres barred an FTCA claim based on the child’s
injuries.56 In Ortiz, the Tenth Circuit “join[ed] the many panels of this Court that have criticized
the inequitable extension of this doctrine to a range of situations that seem far removed from the
doctrine’s original purposes.”57
Another example of this comes from Mondelli v. United States where a servicemember’s
child was born with retinal blastoma, a genetically transferred form of cancer of the retina, due to
her father’s service when he was ordered to stand near and march towards the site of a nuclear
explosion without protective clothing. 58 The resulting radiation doses were believed to cause the
injuries to his daughter’s eye. 59 The Third Circuit lamented that barring the claim would be an
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injustice but nevertheless “conclude[d], with reluctance, that the claims . . . are barred.”60 In a
similar Ninth Circuit case, a wrongful death action was filed by a servicemember’s husband after
a pregnant servicemember was ordered by her superiors to conduct physical training in
contravention of her doctor’s orders, which induced premature labor.61 The Ninth Circuit ruled
that “in light of Supreme Court and our own precedent, we regretfully conclude that [Feres bars
the claim].”62 While circuit courts continue to note the unjust and overly expansive application of
the Feres Doctrine, they are bound by Supreme Court precedent. Fortunately, it seems that in
allowing harmed servicemember to file claims, the 2020 NDAA is also inferring the rights of third
parties to bring claims. Past Feres case law, however, has highlighted the need for courts to make
exceptions explicit.
Additionally, the language of the provision appears to give broad discretion to the Secretary
of Defense and provides little procedural guidance, which has already proved problematic. 63 The
NDAA provides that the “Secretary [of Defense] may allow, settle, and pay a claim against the
United States.”64 The modal verb “may” suggests compensation for any claim is not guaranteed
and gives the Department of Defense discretion with whether to comply. Natalie Khawam, the
attorney who represented SFC Stayskal, reported that as of October 15, 2020, her firm had filed
more than 75 claims, including more than 60 malpractice and 14 wrongful death cases, and had
received no response from the Department of Defense.65 Upon inquiry, a Department of Defense
spokeswoman stated that claims would be processed once they developed an “interim final rule to
implement the processing of claims, which allows servicemembers to file medical malpractice
claims under certain circumstances.” 66 If these claims are eventually processed, the NDAA
provides that, assuming the Secretary of Defense determines the claim to be “meritorious,” any
amount in excess of $100,000 must be reported to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment. 67
Without clear or concise guidelines on how this process is supposed to work, such procedures for
compensation will be at best inefficient and at worst withheld entirely.
V.

Congress Must Amend the FTCA by Explicitly Defining “Incident to Service”

Strict reliance on the Department of Defense’s ability and willingness to pay administrative
claims is insufficient to make servicemembers harmed by military medical malpractice whole.
Furthermore, when faced with claims brought by servicemembers, the Supreme Court has
continually relied on the “incident to service” precedent left by Feres in denying certiorari, most
recently in Daniel v. United States (2019).68 Supreme Court justices on both ends of the political
spectrum have voiced criticisms of this reliance on Feres, most notably Justice Ginsburg, Justice
60
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Thomas, and Justice Scalia. 69 While Feres still stands, overwhelming discretion is granted to the
government to essentially decide whether or not to prosecute itself. In order to offset the harm
caused by Feres, Congress must limit this discretion. To accomplish this, Congress must amend
the FTCA by explicitly defining what types of activities and injures truly are “incident to service.”
The solution to this issue is not a complete lifting of the federal government’s liability
shield. Amending the FTCA to narrowly define “incident to service” will help in identifying which
injuries are actionable and which are not. Military service often involves training and actions
which “outside the military . . . could be seen as tortious but in fact are vitally important” and must
remain unactionable.70 As stated earlier, the concern that allowing civil tort litigation on behalf of
servicemembers will undermine military discipline is legitimate if left unclear. It should not be
particularly difficult, however, to differentiate vitally important training or operational objectives
from egregious misconduct. Professor Andrew Popper, a veteran of the Marine Corps and staunch
opponent of the Feres Doctrine, outlined seven specific behaviors that must be actionable, among
them medical malpractice. These seven categories are: (1) sexual assault; (2) rape; (3) extreme
physical violence or acts that fall within the definition of torture, domestic violence, and child
abuse; (4) acts of clear or gross medical malpractice; (5) exposure of servicemembers to
pharmaceuticals, narcotics, or toxins without informed and voluntary consent; (6) while in military
service, acts of driving under the influence of alcohol or narcotics on more than one occasion; (7)
and acts of patterns of invidious discrimination on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, or gender. 71
Declaring that any of the above behaviors are “incident to service” is unreasonable because they
neither satisfy a discernable operational nor clear training objective.
Congress must adopt a clear standard for deciding what types of behaviors are “incident to
service.” The courts have applied the “incident to service” standard so broadly that virtually any
activity involving a servicemember qualifies. 72 Congress should explicitly make each of the seven
behaviors above actionable. Further, for behaviors not described above, the Court must ask
whether they satisfy a clear operational or training objective. If they do not, then the DFE should
not apply.
VI.

Call to Action

In an attempt to maintain military discipline, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Feres created
a grave injustice; its inequitable results are frequently cited by reluctant courts compelled to follow
its precedent.73 There are many different lenses through which one could approach this ruling,
each involving a unique set of moral, practical, and legal implications.
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First, from a moral standpoint, servicemembers are being asked to fight and possibly give
their lives for a system of justice from which they themselves are excluded. Virtually every
Congressman, President, and politician has dedicated considerable time to thanking military
personnel and veterans for their service and sacrifice. If those expressions of appreciation are
genuine, they should be supported by action. Congress is uniquely situated to pass legislation
undoing the harmful effects of the Feres Doctrine, as attempted by Representative Speier in
2019.74 Legislation passed to date, including the 2020 NDAA, is insufficient.
Second, from a practical standpoint, misconduct is deterred by accountability for
misconduct. As discussed in earlier sections, an argument frequently used in support of the Feres
Doctrine is that civil tort litigation will undermine military discipline and respect for the chain-ofcommand.75 While the military is certainly predicated on discipline, which is characterized by the
willing and responsive compliance with regulation, it is also predicated on accountability. 76 If the
federal government is never held responsible for misconduct, then there is nothing to deter its
repetition. Conversely, if Congress imposes liability on the federal government for conduct the
federal government already prohibits, such as medical malpractice, such a deterrence will ensure
that perpetrators are held responsible and decrease the prevalence of such misconduct. This is a
fundamental goal and principle of tort law in the civil justice system.77
Lastly, from a legal standpoint, the Feres decision rests on dubious grounds and must be
negated by Congressional action. In his Feres opinion, Justice Jackson acknowledged the unstable
foundation upon which the Court built its ruling, writing “no conclusion can be above challenge,
but if we misinterpret the Act, at least Congress possesses a legal remedy.” 78 Congress must
acknowledge the Feres ruling for what it is—an overreaching act of judicial activism. Judges are
not legislators or formulators of public policy. Their roles are to resolve disputes and determine
the constitutionality of particular actions, but not to make law. Congress must use the legal remedy
it possesses to reign in this act of judicial activism.
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